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Smith has defended the rationalist's conceptual claim that moral requirements are 
categorical requirements of reason, arguing that no status short of this would make 
sense of our taking these requirements as seriously as we do. Against this I argue that 
Smith has failed to show either that our moral commitments would be undermined by 
possessing only an internal, contextual justification or that they need presuppose any 
expectation that rational agents must converge on their acceptance. His claim that this 
rationalistic understanding of metaethics is required for the intelligibility of moral 
disagreement is also found to be inadequately supported. It is further proposed that the 
rationalist's substantive claims - that there are such categorical requirements of reason 
and that our actual moral commitments are a case in point - are liable to disappoint- 
ment; and that the conceptual claim is fatally undermined by reflection on how we might 
best respond to such disappointment. 
I will understand by ratio?zalism the claim that moral requirements 
are categorical requirements of reason. I t  is a widely held and seems 
a reassuring view. Thus, in 'Morality as  a System of Hypothetical 
Imperatives', Philippa Foot famously writes: 'We are apt  to panic a t  
the thought that we ourselves, or other people, might stop caring about 
the things we care about, and we feel that the categorical imperative 
gives us some control over the situation." Rationalism may seem to 
address this panic. But Foot can make no sense of it: the categorical 
imperative is an illusion and we do not need the control it purports to 
offer. 
What inspires the panic, Foot makes clear, as does Kant, her im- 
mediate target,' is fear of a certain contingency in what is valuable. 
Foot does not think this fear should tempt us to the seeming security 
of rationalism. Thus the defenders of Leningrad would have been 
unlikely to worry much a t  any thought of the sheer contingency of 
their solidarity. Can't we, she asks, think of the moral community as 
like 'volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and truth and 
against inhumanity and oppre~sion'?~ 
It  is worth getting clearer about what the feared contingency in- 
volves. The thought that inspires panic is that, had we valued different 
l 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives', repr. in her Virtues and Vices, 
Oxford, 1978. p. 167. 
There are numerous relevant passages in Kant but see especially pp. 59-63 of the 
Groundwork (second edition pagination). 
Foot, p. 167. 
things (or if we came to), different things would be valuable. The worry 
does not arise for very strong forms of moral realism, but for those 
rnetaethical positions which see value as in some way response- 
deperzdent it becomes very real. However, such response-dependency is 
consistent with my insistence that torturing human babies for fun is 
wrong applying not just to the actual world but to any world - for i t  
may be part of the substantive content of my moral judgement that this 
wrongness is not conditional on my responses. Even if all I am doing is 
voicing a response, that  response may have wide-ranging generality. 
Such generality indeed typically distinguishes moral commitments 
from mere tastes: they apply to others as well as oneself, including 
one's own possible and future selves. If a side-effect of this medicine is 
that I lose my taste for Coca-Cola, I could not care less. If it will cause 
me to lose my aversion to betraying my friends, I care lots: to lose my 
aversion to betrayal is to become, by my own lights, contemptible. We 
cannot simply say that if we valued different things different things 
would be valuable. In particular our moral attitudes apply even where 
those attitudes are not to be found. Nothing stops my saying that 
social arrangements on Teflon B are unjust, though nobody on Teflon 
B may greatly care. Let us then say that our moral judgements possess 
strong modal generality. 
We have nonetheless a form of contingency in so far as, although our 
judgements enjoy strong modal generality, they may also be, especially 
on accounts that  stress their response dependency, what we might call 
modally perspectiual. The generality they enjoy they get from us, here, 
now, in this world. I t  is our valuing as we do that gives our evaluative 
world its shape. And we might have valued very differently. I t  is in this 
sense that  our values may be contingent. 
The claim that values are contingent in this sense is surely plausible. 
But Michael Smith, particularly in his paper 'Dispositional Theories of 
V a l ~ e ' ~  and, more recently, his book The Moral Problem5 and his paper 
'Internal  reason^',^ has argued that this claim is false, a t  least in the 
case of moral values. A central part of his case moreover has been that 
such contingency would leave our values undermined. 
For Smith, panic a t  the prospect of contingency is wholly justified. 
Our legitimate panic, he insists in the first of the works named, stems 
from the thought that if we stopped caring about morality, or had 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol., lxiii (1989). 
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never started, our caring would come to seem 'rationally optional', 
'arbitrary', 'to be explained away rather than justified', to be explained, 
like loving Leningrad, in terms of the contingencies of our upbringing. 
If we came to see our moral commitments in this way we would rightly 
panic because we would no longer be able to take seriously the idea of 
disapproving of someone for failing to share them.7 
Smith notes how moral attitudes of approval and disapproval con- 
trast with ordinary cases of attachment, aversion and indifference, 
liking and dislihng. Where the latter are concerned we are apt to 
think there is nothing wrong with those we differ from; they make no 
mistake. Perhaps we dislike them but what we merely like and dislike 
about such people is, he protests, arbitrary. We need not take seriously 
what we dislike about each other and would consider undoing our 
dislikes. 
Smith concedes that something along the lines of the points made 
above about strong modal generality may help here to explain why 
I cannot simply consider undoing my dislike, and so to capture the 
difference between our concern for justice and a taste for Coca-Cola 
or - his example - a dislike of people who smile a lot. Accepting a 
rationalist theory would allow us, like Kant, sharply to distinguish the 
demands of morality from more ordinary desires, aversions, etc.; but 
rejecting such an account certainly does not deprive us of the ability to 
make the appropriate distinctions among the members of our respect- 
ive motivational sets. 
Given this concession, Smith's argument cannot simply be that we 
need his rationalist claim to distinguish between moral disapproval 
and mere liking. He needs to say rather more than this and what he 
says is that the foregoing does not remove the feeling of arbitrari7ze.s~. 
In this world I dislike myself in another; in that other I dislike myself 
in this. 'How peculiar each of these attitudes seems, in the context of 
each other!" I t  is more plausible to suppose my attitude explained by 
a belief that I am, in the actual world, possessed of a justification for 
caring for justice. For only thus can I explain my apparent ability to 
question why I have the attitudes I do in both worlds. So we do need 
the control Foot thinks we can dispense with. Only then can we say 
what we need in cases of disagreement - that someone is being in- 
sufficiently sensitive to the available reasons. 
We plausibly already have what Smith is here demanding. There is 
actually far from nothing I can do to justify my interest in justice. But 
that is just the point - that there is actually far from nothing. For I 
' 'Dispositional Theories of Value', 103 
Ibid., 105. 
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actzcaLly value many things. If I care about morality, as Foot under- 
stands it. what I care about is a system of hypothetical imperatives. 
And, given such system, i t  might realistically be hoped that some 
ingredient thereof - my interest in justice say - is open to justification 
in terms of others that make up its background. Within the system of 
values, interests and institutions we inhabit there is plenty for the 
justification of ethical and other claims to be. 
But we have only the most tenuous foothold in that system when we 
ask for a justification that would speak not merely to us and those 
suitably like us but to any rational being. The only norms such a 
justification can presuppose are norms of rationality and here any 
rationalist faces his most fundamental difficulty. Either we construe 
'rationality' relatively narrowly, counting as norms of reason little 
more than the thinnest constraints of consistency, in which case i t  is 
highly implausible that the desired justification of substantive moral 
claims can be made good; or we construe it relatively generously, in 
which case the outlook for such justification is less bleak but its 
starting point will have built into i t  too much in the way of morality to 
make the justification very powerful or interesting. On the latter, more 
generous reading, it may be that  only those lucky enough to have been 
well brought up will qualify as rational beings and what looked like a 
strong Kantian claim would turn out to be a far more unassuming 
Aristotelian one. 
But that  there is no more ambitious and universal justification to 
be had of our evaluative commitments does not entail that  they must 
enjoy no justification a t  all. What i t  Inay more plausibly entail is 
rather that all justification is internal, contextual justification, its 
efficacy conditional on the comn~itments we carry with us a t  the out- 
set. This conditional efficacy does not debar us from taking our com- 
mitments seriously. Plausibly m7e take them as seriously as  we do not 
because of their rational credentials but because they are so deeply 
and strongly felt. 
Consider, after all, Romeo. I t  is rationally arbitrary that Romeo likes 
girls a t  all, never mind that girl, something to be explained rather than 
justified. But Romeo takes his feelings for Juliet very seriously indeed. 
And why shouldn't he? Get him to see that he is not rationally required 
to feel as he does and just watch his eminently sensible failure to care 
less. In other possible worlds where Romeo is homosexual or asexual 
his actual commitments may look strange to hirn, just as our own 
moral attitudes might seem peculiar from a suitably remote perspec- 
tive. What else would we expect? Any perspective on the world looks 
strange from a remote perspective. Distant perspectives take us a long 
way from where we are a t  home. And when we are far from home 
things look strange to us. 
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By 'arbitrary', Smith means ratiolzally arbitrury. His worry is that we 
might have no reason a t  all for having the dispositions, desires and 
attitudes we do. But the fact that we have no reason for having the 
desires we do does not mean that, having those desires, we have no 
reason to pursue their objects. Thus, to take a simple example, I like 
beer. I have no reason for liking it; I just do. The taste can be explained 
but not justified. Given that I like beer I have reason, other things 
equal, to purchase it in preference to, say, wine, which I like less. But 
suppose i t  were argued: I have no reason for my taste and since my 
reason for so acting appeals to this taste I have no reason for my 
purchase. That is a strange and unconvincing argument (remember 
Romeo). 
It would be similarly strange to argue that  while we may have 
internal reason, given our actual inclinations, to care about justice or 
liberty, that  should fail to count as a reason at all because we have 
no reason for having these inclinations rather than others.' There is 
no reason why that should undermine our ability to take seriously 
the justifications that  presuppose such basic values as  Inay have or 
require no such justification. 
In the more recent writings mewtioned above, Smith goes a long way 
towards acknowledging this. The wine and beer example is his own" 
and he sees no problem in acknowledging that what we have reason to 
do may be relative to circumstances involving our tastes that  are, pre- 
sumably, rationally arbitrary. The contingent attachments of Romeo's 
he would presumably wish thus to absorb into the category of circum- 
stance. At first glance this may look like sleight of hand - arbitrary 
desires are allowed as rational influences so long as they are hived off 
into the category of circumstances. Some, after all, of what Smith hives 
off in this way consists in quite arbitrary desires of the agent, desires 
whose arbitrariness does not prevent their counting ainong the agent's 
reasons. 
Smith, however, intends that we understand this manoeuvre in the 
light of a point about convergence. The claim is that all rational 
creatures, given ideal rationality, should converge in what reason 
commits them to. We do, he thinks, get convergence in the wine and 
beer case but i t  is convergence at the level of hypothetical desires. 
This talk of hypothetical desires seems strained. I can certainly 
recognize that given her circumstances Juliet has reason to sleep with 
Romeo. But i t  sounds odd for me to say I hypothetically desire, con- 
= As Smith does. See 'Internal Reasons', 124. 
The Moral Problem, pp. 170 f.; also 'Internal Reasons', 122 1: 
ditionally on occupying those circumstances, to do this myself R'Iuch 
the readiest sense to be made of this is plausibly as an ungainly way 
of saying I recognize the force of Juliet's reason. But in fact more than 
this is involved. I can recognize the force of Iago's reason for plotting 
against Othello - he hates the man - but recognizing this I none- 
theless do not endorse his so acting. Here, Smith would stress, I do not 
form the relevant hypothetical desire. Certainly I do not endorse Iago's 
machinations. 
Hence the key disanalogy on Smith's account. We may expect 
rational agents to converge on the judgement that, if we preferred 
wine to beer, then we should choose it; whereas we cannot, he insists, 
expect rational agents to converge on, say, the judgement that  if we 
thought it fine and noble to collect scalps then that is what we would 
have reason to do. Otherwise we would be landed with a relativization 
of the notion of rational support such that  we would no longer find 
ourselves in genuine disagreement with scalp-hunters." 
It is not clear, however, that  any relativization of rational support is 
a t  issue - that  we cannot recognize the force of the scalp-hunter's or 
Iago's reasons. I t  is surely as harmless to acknowledge that, formally 
speaking, a belief that scalp-hunting is good supports a belief that 
a scalp-hunting trip is a good way to entertain visitors as i t  is to 
acknowledge that a belief that there are little green men on the moon 
supports a belief that the moon is a better place than is my office to 
look for little green men. What in each case we object to is precisely 
not the reasoning but what that reasoning starts from, and the 
inadequacies of its starting point are transmitted to its conclusion. The 
difference between the wine and beer case and the scalp-hunting case 
is just this: in so far as our talk of desirability enjoys strong modal 
generality i t  does not fbllow from the fact that your attitude to scalp- 
hunting supports some decision that I need endorse that decision even 
for worlds where, contrary to fact, I share your disagreeable attitude. 
This difference can be articulated without my having to suppose my 
attitude to scalp-hunting anything but contingent in the sense ex- 
plained. We may say of the scalp-hunter's reason that i t  is a bad 
reason only in so far as 'bad' may well be glossed in terms of moral 
badness rather than ratio~zal inadequacy. This Inay be a reason only a 
bad person would have but it would nonetheless give rational support 
to such a person's actions - much as the belief that 7+3=11 gives 
rational support to the belief that 7+3 is prime. Someone who held the 
former belief would have a reason to adopt the latter, a reason we can 
all recognize - no relativism there. But that does not lead us to endorse 
the conclusion - for we think the supporting belief plain wrong. 
" See especially T/LC Mor-ul Pr.oblern, pp. 167 f:; 'Internal Reasons', 120 C 
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Regarded in this light, the only relativity that need be involved in 
the notion of rational support is just the relativity to circumstance 
Smith views as harmless. In the wine-lover's circumstances there is 
reason to drink wine. In lago's circumstances there is reason to plot. 
On both these judgements about rational support we may plausibly be 
optimistic about the prospects for convergence. But that  optimisnl is 
consistent with saying that the case of Iago is distinguished by the fact 
that his circumstances involve character traits and attitudes which, 
albeit contingently, we find repellent. His circumstances render his 
actions morally objectionable but that is consistent with those actions' 
enjoyment of rational support. 
What I disagree with the scalp-hunter about is what sh,ould be done. 
And the reality of that disagreement is no more hostage to any 
possibility of rationally directed convergence here than it is in the case 
where we disagree over whether the local art  gallery should purchase 
a Turner or a Pollock (Smith himself clearly maintains that there is 
no prospect of convergence in such aesthetic matters).12 Our aesthetic 
judgements Inay come from different places and there may be no pros- 
pect of rationally resolving our disagreement. But disagreement i t  
nonetheless is. 
A number of philosophers in the emotivist tradition from Stevenson 
to Harman13 have taken such worries about disagreement and rela- 
tivity to motivate a move towards expressivism; in which case this 
dimension of Smith's argument might invite a re-examination of his 
own case against expres~ivism.'~ This turns out to depend infelici- 
tously on the supposition that  the expressivist is committed to view 
the motivational force of moral commitments as son~ehow indefeasible. 
That is false. What the expressivist is committed to insisting on is a 
essential tie between moral commitment and desire, where desires 
are of course conceptually linked to motivation.15 But the link between 
desire and motivation is not an indefeasible one. So the defeasibility of 
l2 'Dispositional Theories of Value', 98 f. 
l3 Charles L. Stevenson, Etl~tcs and Language, New Haven, 1944, ch. 1; Gilbert 
Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, h4oral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, Oxford, 
1996, ch. 3. 
" See e.g. The Moral Problem, 5.5-5.7; 'Internalism's Wheel', Ratio, viii (1995), 
sect. 1. 
l5 For an elaboration and defence of this commitment see my 'The Externalist and the 
Amoralist', forthcoming in Philosophia. I there argue in particular that the depressive, 
whom Smith takes to make particular trouble fhr the expressivist (The Moral Problem, 
pp. 135 f.) may be understood very much as Smith himself favours understanding the 
amoralist - as failing to make genuine moral (or otherwise practical) judgements. 
the link between evaluation and motivation can be seen as simply 
inherited from the defeasibility of desire and need in no way rule out 
an expressivist understanding of evaluation. We frequently fail to do 
things we desire to do, as, notoriously, when we are akratic (but by no 
means only then). 
We may be reluctant to admit that moral failings are not failings of 
rationality. In Spreading the Word, addressing the question, 'Why is 
it that people want more than the projectivist gives them?', Simon 
Blackburn answers with reference to 
the permanent chimera, the holy grail of moral philosophy. the knock-down 
argument that people who are nasty and unpleasant and motivated by the 
wrong things are above all unreasonable. They aren't just selfish or thought- 
less or malignant or imprudent, but are reasoning badly, or out of touch with 
the facts. It must be an occupational hazard of philosophers to reduce all vices 
to this one. In reality the motivational grip of moral considerations is bound to 
depend on some desires which must simply be taken for granted, although 
they can also be encouraged and fostered.IG 
Smith cites this passage and responds: 
The rationalist's idea is not that we need toprop up our terms of moral assess- 
ment with terms of rational assessment because the moral terms aren't 
enough by themselves. That idea is rather that, in order to understand why 
our terms of moral assessment are enough by themselves, we have to think 
of moral requirements as requirements of reason. To think otherwise is to 
suppose that the charge 'He is malignant!' is like the charge 'He is from 
Berlin!' or 'He constantly grins!' or 'He answers letters written to him in the 
third person in the first!' And that is plainly ~ r o n g . ' ~  
In fact it is far from plain that it is wrong. The charges 'He is from 
Berlin' and 'He answers letters written to him in the third person in 
the first' may well be effective. But how effective depends not just on 
the addressee's being rational, but on others things about her, such as 
her attitude to Berliners or to etiquette. 
Do we expect 'He is malignant7 to be an effective charge when 
addressed to someone merely in virtue of her rationality? I t  is highly 
implausible that any such expectation can be made good. Consider 
daleks.18 What daleks care most about is conquering new territory and 
exterminating as many non-daleks as they possibly can. In pursuit 
"jSPreading the Word, Oxford, 1984, p. 222. 
l 7  Smith, 'Dispositional Theories of Value', 106 f: 
'"aleks are pervasive icons of British popular culture but some non-British readers 
may need to be told they are malign, imperialistic aliens featuring heavily in the vintage 
BBC series Dr Who. 
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of these ends they show fantastic ingenuity and resourcefulness. Far 
from being irrational they are as rational as can be - that  is what 
makes them so dangerous. 
As concerns morality we certainly find ourselves in disagreement 
with daleks. Such disgreement is crucial uis-a-uis Smith's case for 
rationalism as we see when he argues as follows: 
[I]f A says 'It is right to 4 in circumstances C' and B says 'It is not right to J, in 
circu~nstances C' then we take it that A and B disagree: that at most one of 
their judgements is true. And this means in turn that we take it we can fault 
at least one of A's and B's judgements from the rational point of view, for it is 
false. But if this is right then it follows that ... we do in fact expect rational 
agents to do what they are morally required to do. For we can and do expect 
rational agents to judge truly; we expect them to converge in their judgements 
about what it is right to do. Our concept of a moral requirement thus turns out 
to be the concept of a categorical requirement of rationality.lg 
Would we expect daleks to do what they are morally required to do? 
I fear not. We may certainly, if we are internalists, agree that daleks 
can be expected to do what they themselves think right. But we have 
no immediate reason to expect that, were all parties to the disagree- 
ment subjected to some process of rational cognitive psychotherapy, 
they would coilverge on the same judgements about what was right. 
Certainly we do not need to suppose this simply to make sense of our 
disagreement. 
What Smith is doing is too hastily identifying a disagreement over 
P with a belief that P is false and a belief that P is false with a belief 
that P can be faulted from 'the rational point of view'. But this is far 
too fast - one or other of these links requires a lot more argument as 
the following dilemma shows. If we operate with a relatively modest 
understanding of what it takes to make a given sort of statement 
truth-e~aluable, '~ we will want to reject the step from the belief that 
something is false to the belief that it is rationally defective in ways 
that justify an expectation of rationally constrained convergence. If, 
for example, we buy into the sort of minimalist conception of truth 
advocated by Crispin Wright we will see little more to a given claim's 
being truth-evaluable than its having the surface syntax of an asser- 
tion and its being subject to a t  least a degree of normative discipline. 
On this view, the issue of truth simply comes apart from any expec- 
tation of convergence and Smith's second identification fails. If, on the 
other hand, we place rather more demanding conditions on a discourse 
being truth-apt, that  step may be in the clear. But we can no longer 
assume without further argument that  the mere possibility of dis- 
IY Tfze Moral Problem, pp. 86 f. 
" See Crispin Wright, Truth und Objectivity, Cambridge, Mass., 1992. 
agreement suffices for imputations of truth or falsity. On any such 
immodest conception of truth-aptness the expressivist option remains 
wide open and the first identification fails. 
Smith has not then established his conceptual claim that, failing the 
truth of rationalism, moral reasons cannot be not reasons a t  all. The 
most he seems entitled to conclude is that, failing the truth of ration- 
alism, moral reasons are not the sort of reasons he thinks they are. 
And that  is just what the anti-Kantian opposition were saying all 
along. 
What do we do with those who fall outside the space of values and 
commitments we share? Well perhaps we argue with them, try to 
persuade them to adopt better values. Much here depends on just how 
far outside they are: we can argue with them only if there is enough 
common ground for our arguments to get some purchase. But the 
prospects may often, in practice, be bleak. Arguments, as Aristotle 
observed, do not suffice to make men good." We need also to rely, as 
Aristotle understood, on the very moral education whose contingency 
so troubles Smith. Where that  has failed we may look to the police or 
the courts. 
We are often properly reluctant to acknowledge that  all else fails, 
that  anyone simply falls outside our con~munities of judgement." It 
is a serious thing to acknowledge and we are loath to do so. So we 
optimistically persevere in offering reasons that pretend to a form of 
what Alan Gibbard calls 'contextual a ~ t h o r i t y " ~  - authority derived 
from a context of shared values. Where this optimism is justified there 
is work to be done by appeals to reason. Rational moral discourse, 
like any discourse, is appropriate only where i t  is possible and to that 
extent the relevant discursive practices and the language in which 
they are embodied presuppose that possibility. That presupposition is 
contextual and neither requires nor can make good any pretensions to 
universality. When it fails, when rve are left lecturing to daleks, our 
utterance becomes pointless but not unintelligible -by our lights what 
we say is true but that  will not interest them. 
If, with some people, our optimism is unfounded, there will be 
no justification of our use of force against them that will speak to 
them. But a problem of which Smith has recently made much, of dis- 
tinguishing between justified and unjustified uses of coercive power,24 
" Nicomachean Ethics, X .  9 .  
See Alan Gibbard, 1Vise Choices, Apt Feelings, Oxford, 1990, chs. 10-13 
23 Ttrise Choices, Apt Feelings, pp. 174 ff. 
24 See 'Internalism's Wheel'. 
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need not trouble the arresting officer. What he does may not be justi- 
fiable to those arrested, but that is not, for a good policeman, the main 
issue. The issue is rather whether it can be justified to his superior 
and fellow-officers, to Parliament, the courts and the wider community, 
to us. 
The justification of coercion often appeals not to its victim, but to us, 
the wider community. But suppose we ourselves were corrupted and 
altered? This fear, the fear that we might that  we become, by our 
present lights, contemptible, that the moral perspective from which 
our present attitudes make sense might be lost to us, is not always idle 
fantasy but may signal real dangers (consider the point and content of 
such fictions as Brave New World). In the face of them we are indeed 
apt to panic and our panic may be entirely appropriate, but not in a 
way that should send us running to the categorical imperative. Good- 
ness is indeed fragile but we do not well serve its cause by the pretence 
that  it is less fragile than i t  is." The disintegration of our communities 
ofjudgement is a real danger but faith in a spurious objectivity for our 
values cannot meet it. The con~pelling character of certain values, in 
so far as it cannot be laid at the door of our nature, is contingent upon 
a certain social and political order and on certain educational practices 
- the way we were brought up. If true the point is important but need 
not be subversive. If it is not reason that shores up our values but just 
politics and education, the proper moral is not that we may no longer 
take our values seriously but rather that politics and education should 
be taken very seriously indeed. 
We do not, of course, expect daleks to do what they are morally re- 
quired to do. We may say of them what devotees of etiquette may say 
of the incurably ill-bred - they are not 'one of us'." So alien would such 
beings be indeed that our notions of disapproval and blame may 
become intolerably strained. It must again be stressed, however, that 
none of this is because daleks are, in any non-question-begging sense, 
irrational. They are fantastic chess players, brilliant logicians, and 
pursue their gruesome ends with unrelenting ingenuity and fore- 
thought. 
'Wf. hIartha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodrzess, Cambridge, 1986, esp. ch. 13. 
On 'one of us' it is instructive to compare Smith's 'Dispositional Theories of Value', 
107 f., to Gibbard's Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, p. 206. It is one thing to say, a s  Johnston 
does ('Dispositional Theories of  Value', Proceedir~gs of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol., 
lviii (19891, 169 f.) that the comnzu~zity of our evaluative judgement is ideally inclusive, 
another to suggest that our values are discredited if' the ideal somewhere fails. 
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Some may get very cross a t  my going on about daleks so much - they 
are after all creatures of a somewhat idle fantasy, great for scaring the 
kids but of dubious interest to mature moral reflection. The point is 
however precisely my own. Smith backs up his large claims about the 
power we must impute to reason by pointing to the role it plays in our 
actual ethical practices. S L ~ C ~  considerations have little bearing on 
speculation about how we might deal with creatures such as daleks. 
We do not encounter such creatures and are not likely to. As Gibbard 
writes, 'What matters chiefly is not what we can say to strange beings 
who are merely conceivable, but what we can say to each other.'27 
Smith's perspective is very different. 'So long,' he writes, 'as we can 
imagine some hypothetical rational creature to whom we cannot 
justify our moral beliefs, the search for moral reasons in support of 
them is in place. (Just think of the practice of moral theorizing.)"' 
Smith seems to have argued himself into a position that commits 
him to seeing the amenability of daleks (say) to our own reasons for 
action as a condition for taking our own reasons seriously. And that is 
scarcely credible. 
Smith distinguishes between what he calls the rationalist's substan- 
tive and his conceptual claim. The arguments I have criticized are 
intended only to support the conceptual claim that part of what we 
understand by a moral requirement is a requirement of reason, not the 
substantive claim t,hat there are moral requirements so understood. 
This is unsatisfying and not only because the history of attempts to 
back up the substantive claim is so chequered. For by securing only the 
conceptual claim, we are left with tm7o hostages to fortune reflection on 
which will, I will close by suggesting, render the conceptual claim itself 
less plausible. 
First there is the danger that the substantive claim turn out to be 
false. If the conceptual claim were true the upshot of this would be, as 
Smith notes, that we would have to accept an error theory of morality 
somewhat along the lines of hlackie's. Considering this possibility 
seriously brings us into territory that has already been admirably 
delineated by Blackburn in his 1985 paper 'Errors and the Phenom- 
enology of Value'.29 If we came to be convinced that we had been mis- 
taken in supposing our moral attitudes to be objective requirements 
of reason, we would not be likely simply to dispense with them. Our 
27 Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, p. 201. 
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attitude to justice or to aggravated murder is plausibly just not up 
for grabs in this way any more than is Romeo's attitude to Juliet. V17e 
would continue to punish murderers and favour just over unjust 
regimes because these are things we care about so much. What we 
more plausibly would do is reconstrue these attitudes in terms of, in 
Blackburn's words, 'some lesser, purged commitments that can be held 
without making metaphysical  mistake^.'^' Blackburn labels this re- 
constructed substitute for moralizing 'shmoralizing'. He invites us 
to consider what this shmoralizing might look like and suggests a 
plausible answer - that it would look exactly like moralizing. If that 
answer is right, of course, i t  is curtains for the error theorist. And it 
is curtains for the error theorist precisely because it is curtains for 
the realist's, and a fortiori the rationalist's, conceptual claim. If our 
practice would be unaffected by our despairing of the substantive 
claim the conceptual claim is unsupported. 
The second hostage to fortune is less familiar but is, in effect, a 
generalization of the Euthyphro Dilemma. In terms of Williams's 
splendid formulation, if we seek to pass the moral buck onto how the 
world is,31 we run the real and avoidable risk that the world may let us 
down. The security of our values may be threatened, on a rationalist 
story, not just by the possibility that the rationalist may be wrong but 
that he may be right in alarming ways. If all initial sets of values can 
be expected rationally to converge on a single set, some such sets must 
presumably end up a vast distance from where they started. And the 
possibility will be real that  our own values are a case in point. The 
rationalist must insist that there can be an argument between our- 
selves and daleks, say. But until his promissory note is cashed he 
cannot guarantee that daleks will not win it. 
Suppose they did. Consider a very simpIe-minded moral realist. This 
simple-minded realist believes that there are moral sentences written 
in the sky and i t  is by their agreement with these that our moral 
commitments gain their authority. To show the simple-minded realist 
that he is wrong we need to invite him to imagne discovering that 
there are indeed such heavenly sentences but that they say surprising 
and unwelcome things. Perhaps they call upon us to be like daleks. 
One response to learning this would be to change our substantive 
moral commitments accordingly. Another, and far more natural, would 
be simply to say that, in that case, the sentences in the sky had ceased 
to interest us. The latter response eliminates entirely any plausibility 
this story may have had about where the authority of morality comes 
from and leaves us to look for different sources of authority closer 
Ibid., p. 150. 
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to home. Smith is not a simple-minded realist and the story he tells 
is already closer to home, but he must confront a like possibility, the 
pssibility that the truth about morality, as constituted by the cat- 
egorical requirements of reason, turns out to be something awful. That 
js not a possibility we can seriously entertain. We plausibly secure our 
right to rule that  out in advance only a t  the cost of recognizing a 
certain contingency to that right. If we try to entertain this possibility, 
what we will find ourselves saying is surely: so much the worse for the 
categorical requirements of reason. If such requirements and our 
responses came apart in this way we would rightly feel we had no 
further interest in the former. And that is surely a reason to doubt that 
we are very interested in them now. Or that we ought to be.32 
32 I've been helped with this by my former colleagues a t  Lancaster, especially John 
Foster, Alan Holland and John O'Neill, and by participants in the British Society 
for Ethical Theory's 1996 conference a t  Keele, especially Matthew Kieran, David 
McNaughton, Philip Stratton-Lake and Nick Zangwill; a s  well as by referees for 
Utilitas. Many thanks to all these. 
